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Abstract
Improving  weak  teaching  may  be  one  of  the  most  effective  means  of  raising  pupil 
achievement. However, teachers’ classroom practices and the teaching ‘process’ may matter more to 
student learning than teachers’ observed résumé characteristics (such as certification and experience). 
There  may also be important  differences  in  teacher  characteristics  across  government  and private 
schools which may help explain the large documented public-private achievement differences often 
found in studies. This paper delves into the black-box representing ‘teaching’ to uncover the teacher 
characteristics and teaching practices that matter most to pupil achievement. This is done using unique 
school-based data, collected in 2002-2003 from government and private schools from one district in 
Punjab province in Pakistan. The data allow exploitation of an identification strategy that permits the 
matching of students’ test scores in language and mathematics to the characteristics of teachers that 
teach those subjects. Within pupil (across subject rather than across time) variation is used to examine 
whether the characteristics of different subject teachers are related to a students’ mark across subjects. 
The data are also unique in asking all subject teachers questions pertaining to their teaching practices 
and these, often unobserved, ‘process’ variables are included in achievement function estimates. Our 
pupil  fixed-effects  findings  reveal  that  the  standard  résumé  characteristics  of  teachers  do  not 
significantly matter to pupil achievement. Perversely, however, teachers are found to be rewarded for 
possessing these characteristics highlighting the highly inefficient nature of teacher pay schedules. Our 
findings also show that teaching ‘process’ variables matter significantly to student achievement. There 
are important differences across school-types.        
*Corresponding Author: Department of Economics, University of Oxford, Manor Road, Oxford, 
OX1 3UQ, United Kingdom, Telephone: +44-1865-271089.
Email: monazza.aslam@economics.ox.ac.uk
JEL Classification: I21
Keywords: teacher characteristics, pupil fixed-effects achievement, government and private middle-
schools, Pakistan
1
1. Introduction
Identification of the characteristics and practices of  teachers that  contribute most  towards 
improving pupil achievement has often eluded researchers even though the most effective means of 
improving school quality may be through addressing weak teaching (Glewwe & Kremer, 2006, pp. 
995). The objective of this paper is to delve into the black-box representing ‘teaching’ to uncover the 
teacher characteristics and teaching practices that matter most to pupil achievement.
Past literature probing teacher quality has adopted one of two approaches. In the first, an 
educational  production  function  links  measurable  teacher  characteristics  to  pupil  achievement, 
controlling  for  student  characteristics.  The  methodologies  adopted  in  this  approach  vary,  from 
Instrumental  Variable  (IV)  approaches  (Hoxby,  1996;  Kingdon  &  Teal,  2007;  Sprietsma  & 
Waltenberg,  2005)  to  panel  data  studies  (Clotfelter,  Ladd  & Vigdor,  2006;  Hanushek,  2005),  to 
randomized experiment studies (Lavy, 2002; Glewwe & Kremer, 2006). The consensus from this wide 
array of studies is that many of the standard teacher characteristics such as certification, training and 
experience  do  not  matter  to  pupil  achievement  (Hanushek  &  Rivkin,  2006).  As  these  resumè 
characteristics  often  underpin  teacher  compensation  policies,  these  findings  are  controversial  and 
widely debated.    
A second approach calculates ‘teacher quality’  as a teacher fixed effect  in an equation of 
student achievement gain where different groups of students (in a given year or over time) are taught 
by the same teacher. The resulting ‘total teacher effect’ enables the researcher to define a good teacher 
as one who consistently produces high achievement growth for pupils. This approach, in estimating 
total teacher effects,  does not require identification of specific teacher characteristics that generate 
student learning. A number of studies have used this approach (Aaronson, Barrow & Sander, 2003; 
Rockoff, 2004; Rivkin, Hanushek & Kain, 2005; and Hanushek, Kain, O’ Brien & Rivkin, 2005) and 
they conclude that teacher quality matters substantially to pupil achievement.  However, when they 
regress this teacher fixed effect on teachers’ observed characteristics, their findings are consistent with 
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those from the more direct achievement production function approach: observable characteristics such 
as certification and training explain little of the variation in teacher quality.
This study takes  the  direct  approach linking teacher  characteristics  to  student  outcomes  in an 
achievement  production  function,  but  with  two  innovations.  Firstly,  we  use  a  methodology  that 
overcomes the biases associated with the non-random matching of students to schools and, within 
schools,  to  teachers.  Secondly,  we  also  test  the  importance  of  classroom practices  and  teaching 
techniques rather than confining attention only to teachers’ resumè characteristics i.e. qualifications, 
experience and training. 
The key empirical challenge in identifying teacher effects arises due to the potential non-random 
matching of students to schools and, within schools, to particular teachers. For instance, if higher-
ability students sort into classes with better qualified/trained/experienced teachers within their grade or 
if teachers possessing these characteristics are systematically assigned to teach the classes with higher 
performing pupils, a positive coefficient on a given teacher characteristic could not be interpreted as 
causal.  Our approach to address such endogeneity is  to estimate  a pupil  fixed effects  equation of 
achievement using cross-section data. Across subject rather than across time differencing is used. The 
idea is exactly the same as in panel data estimates of the achievement production function but we will 
show below that our approach is superior to the panel data approach both methodologically and in 
terms of cost-effectiveness. Apart from Kingdon (2006), the studies adopting this technique use data 
from the US or Europe and look exclusively at teacher gender effects on pupil achievement (Dee, 
2005; Holmlund & Sund, 2005; and Ammermǖller & Dolton, 2007). Kingdon (1996) for India is the 
only study to our knowledge that applies this  empirical  methodology to study the effect  of  wider 
teacher characteristics. 
 The  second innovation  in  this  paper  is  to  test  the  importance  of  (typically  unobserved) 
teaching ‘process’ variables in determining pupil achievement rather than only of observed teacher 
education, experience or training. If unobserved teaching methods are correlated with both observed 
teacher characteristics and pupil achievement, included teacher characteristics variables suffer omitted 
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variable  bias.  The  inclusion of  measures  of  teaching  methods  should  mitigate  such bias.  We  are 
fortunate to have data on measures of various important aspects of the class teaching process.
 Finally,  it  should  not  be  presumed  that  the  achievement  production  function  is  a  universal 
constant, applicable to all school types and all settings. The way in which teacher characteristics or 
teaching practices affect student learning may differ across school types.  In particular, private and 
public schools operate under very different sets of incentives. Pakistan has a large and growing private 
schooling sector which experienced an almost 800 per cent increase at all education levels in the past 
few decades (Aslam 2007a;  Andrabi,  Das & Khwaja 2006).  We will  ask whether the pupil  fixed 
effects achievement production function differs in public and private school systems.   
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the data while section 3 explains the pupil 
fixed-effects  methodology.  Section  4  analyses  the  key  results.  Section  5  extends  the  analysis  by 
looking at differences in teacher characteristics across the government and private sector while section 
6 estimates teacher pay schedules. Section 7 concludes.
2. Data
The data for this study come from a purpose-built school-based survey conducted by one of the 
authors  in  Lahore  district  in  Punjab  province,  Pakistan  in  2002-2003.  Using  stratified  random 
sampling  on  65  schools  (25  government  and  40  private)  in  urban  and  rural  Lahore,  the  survey 
collected detailed information on 1887 pupils in any one section of grade 8 in each sample school. 
Each pupil  filled out  a  questionnaire  with questions  on personal  characteristics  (age,  motivation1, 
gender etc.), parental and family background (parental education and occupation, family structure and 
size, wealth and income etc.), and schooling (books prescribed in school, length of the school week, 
family expenditure on schooling in the past year, hours of home tuition taken etc.). Each child was 
also weighed and his/her height and arm circumference measured. In addition, the Raven’s Standard 
1 In most studies, motivation or child’s educational aspirations are not controlled for. In our purpose designed 
study, special care was taken to obtain a measure, albeit not a perfect one, to capture child motivation. We asked 
the child the question: ‘What is the highest level of education you wish to attain?’ with all possible educational 
levels (such as Middle school or up to 8th grade, Matric or grade 10 etc.) as answer choices.
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Progressive Matrices test and tests of numeracy and literacy were also given to each sampled child2. 
The former was administered with the view to obtain some measure of innate ability. The literacy and 
numeracy tests were developed by the Educational Testing Service (ETS) for use by Knight and Sabot 
in their study in Africa (see Boissiere et al. 1985) and have been discussed extensively in Knight and 
Sabot (1990). We adapted these tests to the Pakistani context, reduced the number of questions to test 
within limited time,  and translated them into Urdu to administer  them to children in the national 
language when the medium of instruction in the school was Urdu3. Availability of standardised tests is 
a unique feature of the dataset and avoids biases faced when relying on national test scores. 
In  addition  to  the  above,  data  on  school  resources  and  expenditures  was  also  collected  by 
interviewing  head  teachers  of  the  schools  through  a  school-level  questionnaire.  Also,  mostly  for 
consistency checks and for some additional information, each child was sent home with a ‘parents 
questionnaire’ which was filled out by the parent (or the child asking the parent questions if parent 
was  illiterate)  and  returned  to  school  authorities  the  next  day.  Information  on  1770  parent 
questionnaires was collected and collated. 
Some additional unique features of our data allow us to go beyond what extant studies have been 
able to achieve in Pakistan. Firstly, in addition to the rich individual and school-level information, 
detailed information was also elicited through a teachers’ questionnaire from all teachers who taught 
the pupils in the  section of grade 8 that was sampled in each school. This included information on 
personal attributes (gender, age, family background, education) and characteristics such as experience, 
tenure and salary etc. As pupils were tested in two subjects - mathematics and a language (Urdu or 
English depending on the medium of instruction of the school), in all schools where these two subjects 
are  taught  by  different  teachers,  for  each  student-subject  row  corresponding  information  on  the 
2 The Raven’s Progressive Matrices test has been used extensively in studies around the world in an attempt to 
control for the ever-elusive ‘ability’. The test consists of 60 items arranged in five sets (A, B, C, D, & E) of 12 
items each. Each item contains a figure with a missing piece. Below the figure are either six or eight alternative 
pieces to complete the figure, only one of which is correct. Each set involves a different principle or "theme" for 
obtaining the missing piece, and within a set and across the sets, the items are roughly arranged in increasing 
order of difficulty.  This test was designed to measure a person’s ability to reason by analogy independent of 
language  and formal schooling.  Although there is  some controversy about how independent  this instrument 
really is of formal schooling, the raw score yields an estimate of ability which is arguably better than not having 
any estimate at all.
3 While  all  government  schools  are  Urdu-medium, private  schools  can  be  either  English-medium or Urdu-
medium. 
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subject’s teacher is available. This allows exploitation of an identification strategy which effectively 
controls for all subject invariant student unobservables. 
The second rare quality of the dataset is that in addition to the standard teacher characteristics, 
information about ‘teaching methods and techniques’ was also obtained. This was done by asking each 
sampled teacher to answer a series of questions such as those recording the minutes/week spent on 
average in giving ‘surprise tests’ or quizzes, maintaining discipline and order, writing material on the 
blackboard and reviewing homework given to the students previously. Teachers also noted whether 
they used lesson-plans, asked students’ frequent questions and read out aloud from notes or text books 
etc while teaching to the sampled pupils in grade 8. These ‘process’ variables provide some insight 
into teacher ‘unobservables’ that affect student achievement. This is because unobserved teacher-effort 
or motivation is captured (albeit  imperfectly)  through some of these variables.  For example,  more 
effective or motivated teachers may plan their lessons in advance, spend more time quizzing their 
pupils and be more interactive by involving students during lessons by asking questions. Finally, we 
also tested all  the  sample  teachers  in  a small  test  of  English.  Their  test  scores present  additional 
measures of the potential ‘quality’ of teaching they provide to the students they teach4.  
Although information was collected on 1887 pupils and 339 teachers from 65 schools, achieving 
identification of teacher effects through pupil fixed-effects entails matching each student subject-row 
to the characteristics of the teacher teaching  that subject. As students were tested in two subjects - 
mathematics and language – the characteristics of these two subjects’ teachers are most relevant. All 
other subject teachers (such as those teaching Islamiyat, History, Geography, Science etc.) are dropped 
from the sample. Moreover, in 13 of the sampled schools we find the  same teacher teaching both 
language and mathematics and these schools are dropped from the sample as there is no variation in 
teacher characteristics across student subject-rows5. Finally, among the sampled schools, information 
on mathematics teacher characteristics was missing for 2 schools and these were also dropped from 
the sample. This effectively leaves us with 50 schools (34 private and 16 government), 100 teachers (2 
teachers per school) and 1410 pupils. The final data set constitutes 2820 observations, with each pupil 
4 The English test consisted of 6 questions. However, one question was deleted during data entry.  
5 Because we rely on within school estimation, sample selectivity is not important.
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represented  twice  –  one  row  for  mathematics  matching  the  math  teacher  characteristics  to  the 
individual, and another for language matching the language teacher’s characteristics to the student6. 
The dependent variable of interest is pupil achievement.  We tested students of grade 8 in two 
subjects (mathematics and language). Each test was composed of 25 questions. When we plot the 
Epanechnikov  kernel  densities7 of  marks  in  the  two  subjects  across  the  two  school  types,  their 
distributions differ considerably (Figure 1). To render the marks in these two subjects comparable, we 
compute z-scores by subtracting the overall mean of the score in that subject from the student’s actual 
score and dividing by the standard deviation of the score in that subject.  The z-scores of the two 
subjects’  marks  are  then used as  the  dependent  variables  and,  by construction,  have mean 0 and 
standard deviation 1. The distribution of the z-scores is similar across the two subjects (Figure 2). 
3. Methodology 
The methodology used in this paper mirrors Kingdon’s (2006) approach. Some of the fundamental 
methodological  issues  surrounding  pupil  fixed-effects  estimation  and  a  key  innovation  using  the 
Pakistan data are summarised here. 
This paper adopts the direct approach linking teacher characteristics to student achievement within 
an achievement production function framework:
Aik = α + βXik + δSk + μi + ηk (1) 
where Aik denotes the achievement of the ith pupil in the kth school and is determined by a vector of 
personal (individual and family-level) characteristics (X) and school and teacher characteristics (S). 
The individual and school-level unobservables are denoted by μi and ηk respectively. Typically, at best, 
data sets  have information about  the average characteristics of  a teacher (i.e.  in the vector S,  the 
6 In 3 of the sample schools, we found more than one teacher teaching any one subject. These were English-medium 
private schools and in all  instances the language (English) was taught by two teachers instead of one. In these 3 
schools we averaged the characteristics of the language teacher and ascribed them to the pupil. 
7 Kernel densities show the distribution of a variable. Thus, a kernel density of student mark shows the 
distribution of student marks.  The height of the distribution shows the frequency of students receiving a given 
mark.  The area under the distribution totals to 1.  Thus, we see that in the distribution of marks in private 
schools, the greatest number (i.e. the highest frequency) of students achieved about 18 marks in reading test. Far 
fewer students achieved marks above 22 or below 10.
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teacher variables have a  k subscript) and achievement production functions estimated using average 
teacher  characteristics  are  ‘across-school’  rather  than  ‘within-school’  estimations  as  there  is  no 
variation in the teacher characteristics within a school.
The availability of data on teacher characteristics by subject for pupils in grade 8 allows us to 
exploit the variation in characteristics and adopt a within-student approach to achievement function 
estimation. A pupil fixed-effects achievement function can thus be estimated as follows: 
Aijk = α + βXik + γTjk + δSk + (μij + εjk + ηjk)   (2) 
where Aijk is the achievement of the ith student in the jth subject in the kth school. X is, as before, a 
vector of personal characteristics of the ith pupil in school  k,  T is a vector of the jth subject-teacher 
characteristics  in  school  k and  S is  the  vector  of  school-level  variables  determining  student 
achievement. The composite error term now represents the unobserved characteristics of the student 
(μij), the teacher (εjk) and the school (ηk). The pupil fixed-effects model for the case of the two subjects 
means the differenced version of the achievement function can be written as:
AiMATHk - AiLANGk  = γ(TMATHk – TLANGk) + (μiMATH - μiLANG)+ (εMATHk – εLANGk) + (ηMATHk – ηLANGk)    (3)  
where only the teacher characteristics are retained in the final estimation (and individual and school-
level variables are dropped) as only these vary within a pupil in a given school. If one believes that 
school  and individual  unobservables are  not  subject-specific  (i.e.  they do not  have a  j subscript), 
equation (3) can be re-written as:
AiMATH - AiLANG  = γ(TMATH – TLANG) + (εMATH – εLANG) (4)
 and regressing differences in pupil’s  test  scores across the two subjects on differences in teacher 
characteristics controls for the unobserved student (individual and family-level) variables. 
There are, however, two important caveats to estimating pupil fixed-effects models as in (4). 
Firstly,  if  student  ability is not  subject  invariant,  (μiMATH -  μiLANG) will  be in the error term and, if 
correlated with any of the teacher characteristics included in (4), could generate an omitted variable 
bias.  Non-random  matching  of  pupils  to  particular  teachers  within  the  school  on  the  basis  of 
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unobserved characteristics is, however, not a problem in our data set as we restrict our analysis to one 
section of grade 8 that is taught a subject by any one teacher within the school. This problem of non-
random matching could have arisen if the 8th grade pupils from any one section within the school 
could either have chosen to be taught by a certain teacher (say brighter students choose abler teachers) 
or if school policy deliberately matched pupils of a certain ability in our sampled section to certain 
teachers. In our sample, all students in a given subject are taught by a single teacher and in the very 
few instances where more than one teacher teaches the pupils,  all pupils are additionally taught by 
those teachers whose characteristics we average across the subject. 
The second caveat to estimating (4) is that teacher unobservables in (εMATH – εLANG) may be 
correlated both with included teacher characteristics and student achievement and this may still bias 
the parameter estimates of the vector of observed teacher characteristics.  For instance, researchers 
cannot often observe teacher ‘effort’, motivation or ability. These unobservables, residing in the error 
term will  potentially determine  pupil  achievement  (for  instance if  greater  teacher  effort  generates 
higher achievement). If more educated, experienced or trained teachers are also more motivated or 
able, or put more ‘effort’ into teaching (by using certain techniques for instance), E(TMATH –  TLANG)
(εMATH – εLANG) ≠ 0 and this violates a basic estimation condition and even pupil fixed-effects estimation 
does not permit interpretation of teacher characteristics as causal. However, biases associated with this 
source of endogeneity may be somewhat reduced in this paper through the inclusion of ‘process-type’ 
variables. Consider the following: suppose people with higher motivation also have higher education 
levels, i.e. teacher education and motivation are positively correlated, and more motivated teachers put 
in  greater  effort  in  teaching  by  planning  lessons,  quizzing  students  frequently  and  adopting  a 
‘participatory’ approach by asking many questions while teaching. By including these process-type 
variables (which may be correlated with unobserved teacher effort, ability and motivation), we may be 
able to reduce, even if not completely eliminate, some of the biases generated with this source of 
endogeneity.
Altonji,  Elder  and  Taber  (2005)  suggest  that  the  size  of  correlation  between  observable 
characteristics can give an idea of the extent of correlation between the unobservables. We examined 
9
the correlation in observed teacher characteristics across the two subjects and found that in case of 
some  teacher  characteristics  there  was  indeed  systematic  correlation.  Consequently,  we  cannot 
confidently interpret the coefficients on teacher variables as free of endogeneity bias.  
4. Discussion of results – peeking into the black-box of the achievement function
Table 1 describes the variables used in subsequent equations while Table 2 shows the descriptive 
statistics  by school  type.  Table  3  shows the  results  from OLS achievement  production  functions 
estimated separately for language and math. For each subject, three specifications are reported. In the 
first specification (column 1 under each subject), the baseline OLS regression is estimated using a rich 
vector of individual, household, teacher and school-level variables. The vector of teacher variables 
includes the standard variables such as teacher certification, training, experience etc. that are usually 
available to researchers. The second specification (column 2) extends the standard production function 
by including a parsimonious set of ‘teaching process’ variables.  These measure class-room practices 
and are aimed at capturing teacher effectiveness. Column 3 includes school-level variables.
Focusing first  on columns (1) and (2) without  and with teacher process variables (under each 
subject), we see that among the individual and family characteristics, most variables have expected 
signs. For example, more aspiring and able pupils (EDU_WISH and RAVEN) perform better. Physical 
tiredness reduces pupil achievement while the home learning environment (proxied by the number of 
books at home) improves learning significantly.  Interestingly,  a higher proportion of sisters reduce 
language achievement significantly while there is no such effect with a higher proportion of brothers. 
No  teacher  or  school  characteristics  other  than  teacher  absence  are  significantly  associated  with 
language  achievement,  but  math  learning  profits  from  having  teachers  with  longer  tenure  and 
specialist teachers, i.e. those who themselves had a degree in the subject they teach – in this case math. 
Students’ language skills benefit from a larger number of minutes spent by teachers in quizzing them 
and maths skills benefit  from having teachers that take time to explain concepts.  Including school 
characteristics in column (3) does not change the coefficients in (2) much.     
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The first cut achievement regressions in Table 3 reveal some interesting findings - one of the 
key results is that while standard teacher variables do not appear to determine students’ language and 
numeracy skills,  some ‘process’  variables clearly matter  depending on the subject:  while quizzing 
benefits language scores, explaining and involving pupils in discussions appear to benefit mathematics 
skills more. However, these ‘across-school’ results suffer from biases and we now discuss the main 
results of this paper presented in Table 4.   
Table  4  presents  the  achievement  production  function  estimates  by  pooling  both  subjects. 
Achievement functions are estimated: 1) across-schools, 2)  within schools using school fixed-effects 
and 3) within pupils using pupil fixed effects. In each case, two specifications are reported – without 
and  with  the  vector  of  process  variables.  We  report  only the  parameter  estimates  of  the  teacher 
variables. The similarity of the results in columns (3) and (5) and columns (4) and (6) i.e. the school 
and pupil fixed effects (without and with process variables) is unsurprising given that they would have 
been identical had it not been for an unbalanced panel since there is no variation within the school 
which is also not within the pupil. This is because in each school we only sampled one section of 
grade 8. Had we sampled at least two sections, teacher characteristics could have been pupil-specific 
rather  than  subject-specific  provided  the  two sections  were  taught  by  different  teachers  within  a 
school.
Focus first on the pupil fixed-effects results in columns (5) and (6) as these are of most interest to 
us. Comparing the estimates without and with process variables, among the significant coefficients, 
the inclusion of class-room practice variables causes the coefficient on TTENURE to decline from 
0.018 to 0.010. This suggests that it may not be tenure per se which generates an improvement in pupil 
achievement; it may be the adoption of certain teaching practices by teachers with more experience in 
a given school that increases pupil achievement. Alternatively, teachers who adopt certain teaching 
techniques and are more  efficient  may also have their  contracts  renewed (and hence have greater 
tenure). Disentangling which of these two effects may be operating is not possible in this study.    
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Focus  now on  column  (6)  in  Table  4.  One  of  the  most  striking  findings  is  that  a  student’s 
standardised mark in a subject taught by a female teacher is 0.5 standard deviations lower than if the 
same student were taught by a male teacher. Female students, however, appreciably benefit from being 
taught by same-sex teachers - their standardised mark increases by about 0.2 standard deviations8. A 
number  of  explanations  can  rationalise  this  finding  (Holmlund  and  Sund,  2005).  Firstly,  the 
‘preferences’ explanation suggests that teachers of a given sex have preferences for students of the 
same gender, and may reward same-sex students in terms of higher grades. A second, ‘stereotyping’, 
explanation argues that teachers own stereotypes may influence their evaluations of pupils. Although 
these two explanations can be ruled out by arguing that the tests  taken by pupils in this sample were 
neither  administered  by  nor  graded  by  their  teachers,  we  cannot  rule  out  the  possibility  that 
‘preferences’  or  ‘stereotypes’  influence the  way in which knowledge is  transmitted to students  of 
different genders. Finally, a third - ‘role-models’ - explanation, argues that students of the same gender 
may perform better by being taught by same-sex teachers viewed as role models. This hypothesis is 
convincing in light of cultural norms in Pakistan where adolescent girls suddenly face strict mobility 
restrictions  and  may  see  female  teachers  as  effective  role  models.  While  highlighting  possible 
hypotheses, this paper does not delve into which one best explains this result in Pakistan9.         
Teacher  certification  has  no  bearing  on  pupil’s  standardised  achievement.  This  finding 
corroborates international evidence (see Hanushek, 2006 for a summary). Note that variables such as 
teacher  experience  and  tenure  (TEXP,  TEXP2  and  TTENURE)  are  included  merely  as  control 
variables as they are likely to be jointly determined with pupil achievement and we do not discuss 
their coefficients. For example, the positive coefficient on teacher tenure could reflect that more time 
spent  in  a  given  school  (hence  greater  teacher  experience  in  that  school)  raises  pupil  learning 
8 An F-test of the sum of coefficients (FEMTEACH and FEMSTUDTEACH) suggests that the sum of 
coefficients representing the effect for a girl of being taught by a female teacher is significant at the 4% and 5% 
levels respectively in columns 5 and 6 respectively. 
9 While pupil-teacher gender effects are of great interest especially given the feminisation of teaching with the 
mushrooming of private schools in Pakistan, focusing on teacher-pupil gender is not possible within the pupil 
fixed-effects methodology adopted in this paper. The reason for this is that we strive for heterogeneity in the 
gender  of  pupils  and  teachers  to  generate  variation  across  subjects.  However,  while  this  heterogeneity  is 
completely ruled out in government schools (female students are always taught both subjects by female teachers 
while male students are most often taught by male teachers), in our private school sample there is not sufficient 
variation in subject-teacher-pupil gender to allow for a convincing utilisation of the pupil fixed-effects approach. 
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(causation from tenure to achievement) or it could reflect that teachers who are more effective in 
raising  pupil  achievement  are  also  more  likely  to  have  their  contracts  renewed  (causation  from 
achievement  to  tenure).  Arguably,  however,  by  including  a  large  number  of  process  variables 
potentially capturing some elements of teacher ‘effectiveness’ typically unobserved, this bias may be 
considerably reduced.   
The headline  story in  column (6),  however,  is  that  a  large number  of  ‘process’  variables  are 
significant determinants of achievement. Being taught by a teacher with another job (in addition to the 
teaching job in the school) substantially benefits a pupil compared to being taught by a teacher who 
doesn’t have any other job. This could be because more ‘effective’ or better teachers are also able to 
find secondary employment. Alternatively, as a large percentage of school-teachers are employed as 
tutors in evening coaching centres or give extra home tuition to pupils10, the positive externalities of 
teaching different pupils or practice may be passed on to day-time pupils11. It is worth noting that this 
surprising result (positive benefits of moonlighting) is context-specific. As demonstrated later in the 
paper it is an entirely private-school phenomenon:  in government schools there are no positive effects 
for student learning of teachers having a second job. The effect of teacher’s English test scores is also 
significantly positive – a pupil taught by a higher scoring teacher scores, on average, 0.09 standard 
deviations higher than when being taught by a lower scoring teacher. Among the ‘process’ variables, 
largest positive effects on pupil achievement are from being taught by lesson-planning teachers and 
who ask many questions from pupils during lessons. For instance, being taught by a teacher who plans 
lessons raises pupil achievement by 0.23 standard deviations. The effect of asking questions is of a 
similar magnitude. Though the size of the coefficient is small, quizzing on past lessons also raises 
student mark. Finally, increased time spent reviewing homework is inimical to achievement (though 
10 For instance, in the total sample of 339 teachers, 122 state having secondary employment either in evening 
coaching centres, providing private home tuition, some other activity or more than one of the above. Amongst 
those with any secondary job, an overwhelming 71 per cent’s evening/weekend employment is in evening 
coaching or in providing private home tuition.  
11 Another alternative explanation could be that as many day-time students are also coerced into attending paid evening 
tuition often given by the same teachers who teach them during the school day, elements of favouritism increase pupils 
test scores. However, this is not a feasible explanation in this setting as the tests on which the standardised scores are 
based were set  by the author  without  any input  from the teachers.  They were also administered  and  checked  in 
controlled environments without the presence of a teacher who could have guided any ‘favoured’ student or given him/
her a higher score.
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the effect is small) perhaps because it take away from time that could have been spent learning new 
material. 
Summarising the results so far, pupil fixed-effects estimates showcase several interesting findings. 
Firstly,  most  of  the  standard  teacher  variables  believed  to  determine  pupil  achievement  (such  as 
certification and training) and often used to guide education policy,  have no bearing on student’s 
standardised mark. Secondly, gender interaction effects suggest that girls benefit from being taught by 
female teachers and this has important policy implications. However, this study doesn’t delve into 
potential  explanations for  this  effect  (i.e.  whether it  is  because of stereotyping  or because female 
teachers act as role models for impressionable female adolescents).  Finally, the study also finds that it 
is  the  often  un-captured  teaching  ‘process’  variables  that  impact  student  achievement  –  lesson 
planning, involving students through asking questions during class and quizzing them on past material 
all substantially benefit pupil learning.  
Given  that  much  of  past  work  determining  the  effect  of  teacher  characteristics  on  pupil 
achievement has estimated across-school equations such as in column (1) of Table 4, it is of interest to 
see how results change when moving to a within-pupil analysis. Comparing columns (2) and (6) in 
Table 4,  while being taught  by a female  teacher has no effect  on pupil  learning in across-school 
estimation, the effect is large and significantly negative in a within-pupil framework. And while the 
coefficient  on FEMSTUDTEACH is significantly positive  in  (2),  it  more  than triples  in  size  and 
becomes  even  more  precise  in  column  (6).  Among  the  process  variables,  the  size  and  even  the 
significance of a few coefficients changes – for example while minutes spent discussing homework is 
negative and insignificant in (2), the effect almost doubles and becomes significant in (6). Similarly, 
while lesson-planning has  a positive  and insignificant  effect  in  (1),  a  student  taught  by a lesson-
planning teacher benefits a large and significant improvement in achievement if taught by a lesson-
planning compared to a non-lesson planning teacher. Finally, while in column (1), QUESTIONS is 
negative and just significant indicating that pupils taught by a teacher who asks many questions suffer 
a  0.16  deviation  reduced  standardised  mark  compared  to  when  being  taught  otherwise,  this  is 
completely reversed in  the within-pupil  estimates  where  we find that  the same pupil  taught  by a 
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teacher who asks many questions benefits from a 0.21 standard deviation improvement in test scores 
compared to being taught by a teacher asking few questions. Clearly, across-school results are often 
quite dramatically different from with-pupil ones. As the former estimates are often confounded by the 
correlation  between  teacher  characteristics  and  pupil  and  school  unobservables,  they  may  give 
misleading results. Within-pupil estimates are more powerful as they control at least for all subject-
invariant pupil and family-level unobservables that may generate biases in estimation.
Finally,  note  that  teacher  pay  is  absent  from  the  above  estimates  despite  it  often  being  of 
significant policy interest. The appeal of this variable rests in the conviction that higher teacher pay 
may result in improved pupil achievement either through increased teacher effort, or by attracting a 
better pool of applicants in a given school or by creating an incentive for teachers to retain their more 
valuable  jobs  (Kingdon  and  Teal,  2006).  If  true,  this  provides  a  rationale  for  schools  to  adopt 
‘performance-related-pay’  mechanisms,  and offers a tool for  policy-makers to channel  constrained 
resources to improve pupil learning. A key challenge, however, is in identifying the causal effect of 
teacher pay on student achievement. Even within a pupil fixed-effects framework, this is complicated 
because of the various biases (omitted variables and simultaneity bias) associated with the inclusion of 
this variable. While reduced, through the inclusion of process variables potentially capturing elements 
of effort and motivation (often relegated to the error term), biases may not be completely eliminated. 
Therefore, although we estimated identical equations including the teacher pay variable, the results are 
not  reported  in  tables  3  and  412.  We  also  note  that  the  inclusion  of  teacher  salary  in  logs 
(LNTSALARY) did not change any of the results in the two tables and the variable itself was often 
insignificant. While suggesting that increasing teacher pay may not be a potent tool for improving 
student achievement (at least in Lahore), it does raise an interesting question - if higher teacher pay is 
not associated with improvements in students’ test scores, how efficient is the pay schedule in schools 
across Lahore? That is, are teachers rewarded by schools for possessing characteristics that improve 
students’ performance? We explore this question later in the paper.
 5. Learning gaps in government and private schools – what role do teachers play?
12 Results available from authors upon request.
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The  past  few decades  have  seen  something  of  a  revolution  in  the  provision  of  schooling  in 
Pakistan with private schooling increasing more than 800 per cent in slightly more than a decade 
(Alderman, Orazem & Paterno, 2001; Andrabi, Das & Khwaja, 2002; Aslam, 2007a). Until recently, 
much  of  the  debate  about  the  quality  of  government  and  private  schools,  measured  in  terms  of 
achievement differences of their student bodies, was based on anecdotal accounts. However, the very 
obvious emergence of private school provision at all schooling levels and parents’ decision to send 
their children to fee-charging schools rather than opt for free government schools, coupled with higher 
labour market rewards (in terms of higher earnings) for private school graduates (Aslam, 2007b, Nasir 
1999) were seen indicative of the superior quality of schooling provided by the latter. The anecdotal 
accounts of better private quality in terms of higher pupil achievement were translated into robust 
econometric studies with Alderman  et al’s pioneering work in Lahore district in 2001 in which the 
authors proved that private primary schools were indeed imparting better quality education compared 
to government schools. These findings have since been corroborated by more recent evidence often 
with a wider and more varied geographical coverage than Alderman  et al.’s original study (Arif & 
Saqib, 2003, Das, Pandey & Zajonc, 2006, and Aslam 2007a). 
While highlighting the better performance of pupils in the private compared to the government 
sector at the primary education level (Alderman et al., 2001, Arif & Saqib, 2003, Das et al., 2006) and 
the middle-level  (Aslam,  2007a), neither study pinpoints  why private schools are potentially more 
effective. Differences in achievement across school-types can be variously attributed. They could be 
due to variation in the quality of the student body (i.e. selection of more able or motivated pupils into 
private  schools),  difference  in  school  quality  in  terms  of  infrastructure,  school  facilities  or 
management styles, or disparities in teacher characteristics or even the style of teaching. Hence, one 
explanation for private schools’ better performance in Pakistan may be in the exposure of their pupils 
to a set of teachers whose observed or unobserved characteristics are superior to those for government 
school pupils. 
The  differences  in  observed  teacher  characteristics  across  the  two  school-types  are  well-
documented  –  teachers  in  government  schools  are  more  qualified  (have  higher  training,  more 
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experience and tenure), are older and are paid more while those in private schools are younger, most 
often female, are less qualified and are paid considerably less (see table 1). If anything, at first glance, 
this suggests that government school pupils are taught by a superior pool of teachers. However, this is 
by no  means  a  forgone  conclusion.  Firstly,  it  remains  to  be  econometrically  determined  whether 
observed teacher characteristics affect pupil achievement at all across the two school types. Secondly, 
unobserved teacher characteristics such as effort  or  motivation may differ  significantly across the 
school-types.  Indeed,  differences  in  the  political  economy of  hiring and firing,  types  of  contracts 
offered  to  teachers  and  the  resultant  incentive  mechanisms  prevailing  in  government  and  private 
schools may hold the key to at least identifying the differences in unobserved characteristics across the 
two sectors. For instance, government teachers’ recruitment in Pakistan is highly politicised rather 
than  merit-based  with  local  politicians  gaining  votes  by  securing  government  jobs  for  their 
constituents. Moreover, teachers favour government jobs as entry requirements are lax, jobs are most 
often  permanent,  pay better  than  those  in  the  private  sector  and  lack  established  mechanisms  of 
checking teacher presence in school, let alone teacher effort (Ali, 1998). While teaching jobs in the 
government  sector  stipulate  stringent  training  requirements,  the  quality  of  training  is  poor  when 
available, extremely dated with little innovation, and has little relation to teaching the teacher how to 
teach once in school. At the other extreme, private schools often favour hiring female staff (who can 
be paid less compared to males), who are younger and often unmarried and less experienced and less 
trained (though not necessarily less certified).  However, private schools may also monitor  teacher 
presence quite strictly and may even adopt measures to supervise their effort as may be suggested by 
the much higher turnover in private schools perhaps because less effective teachers are fired. 
 In this part of the paper, we look into the black-box and unravel the specific characteristics of 
teachers that may differ between the two school-types enough to generate quite substantial differences 
in  student  achievement.  Table  5  shows  the  results  of  pupil  fixed-effect  achievement  production 
functions estimated separately for government and private school pupils13. The findings show that the 
13 Teacher gender and the gender interaction term is not included in the specification by school-type as all 
government schools are single-sex schools and female students in government schools at grade 8 level are 
always taught by female teachers. While male students may be taught by female teachers, the proportion is 
extremely low. Among private schools, we noted that the gender of the teacher and subject were 
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vector of coefficients differs dramatically across the two sectors. For instance, in government schools 
none of  the  standard  teacher  characteristics  (such  as  teacher  certification  or  training)  matter  to 
student’s  achievement.  The  only  teacher-variables  determining  government  school  pupil’s 
achievement are: TOTHJOB, TSCORE and MINS_QUIZ. A student in a government school taught by 
a moonlighting teacher suffers significantly - her score is 0.22 standard deviations less than if taught 
by a teacher who does not have an evening job. Finally,  the largest positive effect on government 
school  students’  achievement  comes  about  through  higher  TSCORE  implying  that  teachers  with 
higher cognitive skills themselves are more effective in imparting learning.
In sharp contrast, almost all teacher characteristics in private schools have large and significant 
effects on standardised scores. While some variables (such as TMA_PROF and TTABSENT) have 
unexpected signs, a number of variables, often process-type ones go in the expected direction. The 
negative coefficient on TMA_PROF could be indicative of adverse selection – if teachers with MA are 
no more effective in teaching than with BA degrees, only low-ability MA candidates unable to secure 
more lucrative government employment may select into private schools having a debilitating effect on 
pupil achievement. The effect of TOTHJOB in private schools is positive - moon-lighting teachers 
have large and significant positive effects on pupil achievement, raising their standardised scores by 
0.4 standard deviations. This could be due to some reverse causation in the private school achievement 
equation: the more effective teachers are more successful in getting out-of-school jobs to supplement 
their  meagre  private  school  salaries.  The sign on TSPECIAL is  surprising,  indicating that  it  is  a 
disadvantage to be taught a subject by a teacher in which she/he specialised. Among the process-
variables, the findings show that a student taught by a teacher who asks many questions from pupils 
during the lesson improves the mark by a large 0.6 standard deviations.
Finally, a debate in recent years maintains that focusing on differences in achievement across the 
government and private sector may be too simplistic as there are large variations within the two sectors 
(Das  et al., 2006, Aslam 2007a). In both sectors, schools range from elite institutions to extremely 
poor  ones  with  abysmal  conditions,  lacking  even  the  basic  facilities  that  form a  prerequisite  for 
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generating an environment conducive to learning. Thus, variations in achievement among the good 
and bad schools within a sector may be as important as the gaps between the two school-types. 
That not all  government schools have poor-performing pupils and not all  private schools high 
achievers is also apparent from the kernel plots of the achievement distributions presented in Figure 2. 
While on average government school pupils underperform private school counterparts, there is a large 
area of overlap suggesting that a large proportion of ‘good-performers’ in government schools perform 
at levels similar to average-poor performers in private schools. Also note that the lower tail of the 
distribution for private schools almost superimposes on the government school distribution suggesting 
that  the  poorest  performing  private  school  pupils  are  no  different  from the  worst-performers  in 
government schools. At the higher tail-end though, best-performing pupils are almost exclusively in 
private schools.  
In  this  study,  we  can  shed  light  on  some  of  the  potential  factors  underlying  variations  in 
achievement  within the two sectors. From Table 5, we conclude that within the government sector, 
better schools possibly hire more ‘effective’ teachers (i.e. whose English language skills are better and 
who spend more time quizzing pupils on past work) and who adopt some incentive mechanisms that 
discourage teachers from moonlighting.  Good private schools (compared to ‘bad’ ones),  also hire 
more ‘effective’ teachers but their success rests in adopting a teaching methodology that encourages 
pupil-testing and adopting an interactive approach during lessons. Good private schools are also able 
to retain better teachers by renewing their contracts (positive coefficient on tenure) and firing the less 
effective ones.   
6. Rational rewards - Are teachers rewarded for possessing characteristics that improve 
pupil learning?
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 Rationality in teacher pay schedules requires efficiency which means that teacher pay is linked to 
the possession of observed characteristics that are instrumental in raising pupil achievement. In this 
section,  we  estimate  earnings  functions  for  teachers  from the sample  of  65 schools  to  determine 
whether  more  effective  teachers  (i.e.  those  who  raise  pupil  achievement  more)  are  rewarded 
accordingly14.  
As mentioned before, the dataset used in this study sampled students from 65 schools and all 
teachers teaching any one sampled section of grade 8. This yielded a total of 339 teachers from across 
25 government and 40 private schools. Log of teacher monthly salary is regressed on teacher and 
school characteristics in a standard OLS regression. Table 6 presents an across-school OLS equation 
(pooling government and private school teachers and with and without a private school dummy) of log 
of teacher monthly salary in columns (1) and (2) and a school-fixed effects  regression exploiting 
within-school  variation  in  teacher  pay  in  column  (3).  The  latter  yields  more  robust  results  as 
unobserved teacher characteristics generate difficulty in interpreting the effect  of  included teacher 
characteristics as causal (for instance if more able teachers sort into higher paying jobs) and school 
fixed-effects  potentially  control  some  of  the  bias  though  omitted  variable  bias  due  to  teachers’ 
unobserved characteristics remains possible even in this.
The results in column (3) of Table 6 show that teachers are largely rewarded for the possession of 
characteristics which either have nothing to do with improving pupils’ achievement or, in fact, reduce 
it.  For example,  teacher certification is  highly rewarded in the labour market  – the coefficient  on 
TMA_PROF is large and positive. However, this variable doesn’t improve student performance (Table 
4). Similarly, teacher experience clearly has payoffs in terms of increased salary, but in Table 4, it 
clearly reduces pupil  achievement.  Thus, it  would seem that teacher’s salary schedules are highly 
inefficient.
14 To our knowledge only one other study has investigated the issue of rationality of teacher pay scales in 
Pakistan. This study, by Khan (2002), questions whether rural teachers are paid rationally by defining teacher 
‘effectiveness’ as teacher’s cognitive skills in mathematics and comprehension. The author uses data from the 
1980s from rural Pakistan and concludes that public sector pay schedules are extremely rigid while pay 
schedules in the NGO and private school sectors are responsive to qualifications and, hence, less rigid compared 
to the government sector. 
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A more lucid picture emerges when we compare teacher pay schedules across the government and 
private sector. Table 7 reports teacher pay schedules by school type. Firstly,  as before, the across-
school results are very often significantly different from the school fixed-effects results across both 
school types. As the latter are more convincing, we focus on those. Secondly, in table 7 the vector of 
coefficients determining teacher pay is significantly different across both school types. For instance, 
the government school results provide support to the commonly held belief that government pay scales 
are based on fixed factors such as qualifications, training and experience. This is exactly what appears 
to be the case.  On the other hand, private school  salary structures appear relatively more flexible 
although more qualified teachers are rewarded in terms of higher salary. Similarly, in private schools 
the coefficient  on tenure is  positive  and the effect  is  significant  though as this  variable  is  highly 
correlated with experience,  it  is  difficult  to  interpret  the  direct  effect  of  tenure on teacher salary. 
Appendix table 1 presents results of the school fixed-effects regression separately for government and 
private schools excluding TTENURE. As expected, as TTENURE is significantly positive in private 
schools and is positively correlated with TEXP, excluding it in Appendix table 1 causes the effect to 
be picked up by TEXP. The only other noteworthy change is that excluding TTENURE causes the 
coefficient on TMA_PROF to become insignificant suggesting that teacher education and tenure are 
negatively correlated. This is plausible since older teachers (who generally have longer tenure) also 
typically have lower levels of education. The effect of excluding TTENURE in the government school 
sample is negligible and this is not surprising given the insignificance of TTENURE in Table 7. 
In any case, focus now on comparing the school fixed-effects results in table 7 with those in Table 
5.  In  private  schools,  teacher’s  pay  is  linked  with  certification  and  tenure.  While  tenure  clearly 
improves  pupil  achievement  significantly  in  Table  5,  TMA_PROF  has  a  large  and  significantly 
negative effect on student’s standardised marks. Thus, while efficient in one respect, private school’s 
teacher pay schedules are clearly inefficient in another. This inefficiency could, presumably, have to 
do  with  private  schools  either  choosing  to  or  having  to  hire  more  certified  teachers  to  signal 
prospective parents that they have a qualified staff despite qualification having nothing to do with 
productivity.  The  inefficiency  in  rewarding  teachers  is  even  starker  in  government  schools.  In 
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accordance with government policy, government schools reward teachers on the basis of fixed rules – 
better certified, better trained and more experienced teachers are rewarded more and  none of these 
characteristics has any effect in improving students’ standardised mark.
7. Conclusions
The objective of this paper was to delve into the black-box representing ‘teaching’ to uncover the 
teacher characteristics and teaching practices that matter most to pupil achievement. To do so, we 
exploited a unique identification strategy - within-pupil variation was used to estimate the effects of 
teacher characteristics on student achievement. This was done by utilizing data from Pakistan that 
permits the matching of students’ test scores in language and mathematics tests to the teachers that 
teach those subjects, allowing examination of whether the characteristics of different subject teachers 
are related to a student’s marks across subjects.
Apart from the innovative identification methodology used in this study, a further unique feature is 
that the data also allow us to test the importance of classroom practices and teaching techniques rather 
than confining attention only to teachers’ characteristics i.e. qualifications, experience and training. 
Finally,  instead  of  imposing  a  universal  achievement  production  function,  we  provide  separate 
estimates for government and private schools.
The pupil fixed-effects estimates reveal some striking results. One of the findings of interest is that 
most of the standard teacher resumè characteristics (such as certification and training) often used as 
measures  of  teacher  quality  and  used  to  guide  education  policy  have  no  bearing  on  student’s 
standardised mark. However, despite this we find that teachers are largely rewarded for possessing 
these characteristics, which have little to do with improving pupils’ achievement. Thus, teacher salary 
schedules appear to be inefficient.  While this is true more for government schools,  private school 
salary structures appear relatively more flexible although even here more qualified teachers receive 
higher salaries when teacher qualifications are not a significant determinant of student learning.
Another interesting finding is that girls benefit from being taught by female teachers, a finding 
with interesting policy implications.  We also find that the usually un-measured teaching ‘process’ 
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variables  impact  student  achievement  strongly  –  lesson  planning,  involving  students  by  asking 
questions during class and quizzing them on past material, all substantially benefit pupil learning. A 
comparison across the two school-types suggests that within the government sector,  better schools 
possibly hire more ‘effective’ teachers (i.e. whose English language skills are better and who spend 
more time quizzing pupils on past work) and who adopt some incentive mechanisms that discourage 
teachers from moonlighting. Good private schools (compared to ‘bad’ ones), also hire more ‘effective’ 
teachers but their success rests in adopting a teaching methodology that encourages pupil-testing and 
adopting an interactive approach during lessons. Good private schools are also able to retain better 
teachers by renewing their contracts (positive coefficient on tenure) and firing the less effective ones. 
We  conclude  this  paper  with  the  caveat  mentioned  before,  namely  that  differences  between 
teachers in unobserved characteristics still remain a source of endogeneity and undermine the ability to 
attribute causality to observed teacher variables. However, we also note that the biases associated with 
this  source  of  endogeneity  may  be  somewhat  reduced  in  this  paper.  By  including  process-type 
variables which may be correlated with unobserved teacher effort, ability and motivation, we have 
been able to reduce though not necessarily eliminate, some of the biases generated with this source of 
endogeneity.
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Figures
Figure 1: Kernel density estimates of READING and MATHS scores by school-type 
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Figure 2 – Kernel density estimates of stdmark1 by school-type 
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Tables
Table 1: Description of Variables Used
Variable Description
Individual Characteristics
READING Pupil’s score in language (Urdu or English test), maximum score 25
MATHS Pupil’s score in mathematics test, maximum score 25
STDMARK1 Standardised mark
AGEYRS Pupil’s age in years
AGE2 Age squared
FEMALE* Dummy variable, equals 1 if female, 0 otherwise
NUMSIS Number of sisters
NUMBRO Number of brothers
EDUWISH Child’s educational aspirations, index from 1 to 6, for  example 1 = aspires to complete grade 8 
only, 2 = aspires completion till grade 10th etc. 
MEDYRS Mother’s education (completed years)
RAVEN Score on Raven’s ability test, maximum possible 60
TIRED Index of how often child feels tired in class, 1 =  very rarely, 2 = sometimes, 3 = quite often, 4 = 
most of the times 
BOOKS Number of books in child’s home (divided by 1000)
LNFINCOME Natural log of father’s income (Rupees/month)
HTUTAKEN Number of hours of paid home tuition taken by child (divided by 1000)
Teacher Characteristics
FEMTEACH* Teacher is female = 1, 0 otherwise
FEMSTUDTEACH* Interaction between FEMALE and FEMTEACH
TMA_PROF Teacher has MA/MSc. Or MPhil. Or PhD (equals 1, 0 otherwise) 
TTRAINYRS Years of teacher training
TEXP Years of total experience
TEXP2 Teacher  experience squared
TTENURE Teacher’s experience in current school
TTABSENT Total days of absence in past year (including paid/unpaid sick/other leave)
TOTHJOB Equals 1 if teacher has evening/weekend job, 0 otherwise
TSCORE Teacher’s score in English language test, maximum 5
TSPECIAL* Teacher ‘s highest degree is in subject she teaches currently in school
MINS_QUIZ Minutes per week spent in quizzing students on past material (divided by 10)
MINS_HWORK Minutes per week spent in discussing homework given to students (divided by 10)
LESSON_PLN* Equals 1 if teacher plans lessons in advance, 0 otherwise
EXPLAIN* Equals 1 if teacher explains in-class questions while lecturing, 0 otherwise
QUESTIONS* Equals 1 if teachers asks a lot of random questions while teaching, 0 otherwise
School Characteristics
GIRLS_SCHOOL* Equals 1 if school is a girls school, 0 otherwise
RESOURCE Index of school resources
LENGTH_STUDY Minutes per week school time is spent in studying (excluding breaks etc.), divided by 1000
CLASSIZE Actual class size of 8th grade pupils, divided by 100
Note: Variables marked by * are 0/1 indicator variables with Yes = 1 and No = 0.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
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VARIABLE
GOVERNMENT PRIVATE GOVT - PRIVATE
Mean SD Mean SD Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) = (1) – (3)
Individual  
Characteristics
READING 13.19 0.15 15.90 0.15 -2.71 ***
MATHS 7.27 0.12 10.94 0.16 -3.67 ***
STDMARK1 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
AGEYRS 13.59 1.21 13.51 0.93 0.08
AGE2 186.04 34.78 183.27 25.74 2.77 *
FEMALE 0.69 0.46 0.55 0.50 0.14 ***
NUMSIS 2.10 1.51 1.72 1.31 0.38 ***
NUMBRO 2.12 1.27 1.74 1.21 0.37 ***
EDUWISH 4.57 1.34 5.16 1.26 -0.59 ***
MEDYRS 6.19 4.91 8.92 4.91 -2.73 ***
RAVEN 26.12 9.81 33.03 10.10 -6.90 ***
TIRED 1.43 0.69 1.50 0.74 -0.07 *
BOOKS 0.14 0.26 0.23 0.39 -0.09 ***
LNFINCOME 8.55 1.62 9.42 1.39 -0.87 ***
HTUTAKEN 0.25 0.30 0.25 0.30 0.00
Teacher Characteristics
FEMTEACH 0.76 0.43 0.88 0.33 -0.12 ***
FEMSTUDTEACH 0.69 0.46 0.52 0.50 0.17 ***
TSALARY 6777.44 2105.93 3871.32 3625.75 2906.11 ***
LNTSALARY 8.78 0.29 7.97 0.74 0.80 ***
TMA_PROF 0.34 0.48 0.43 0.50 -0.08
TTRAINYRS 1.16 0.72 0.54 0.88 0.62 ***
TEXP 16.41 8.18 6.52 5.84 9.89 ***
TEXP2 334.03 288.90 76.11 118.49 257.92 ***
TTENURE 9.16 7.27 4.61 5.62 4.54 ***
TTABSENT 29.03 33.94 9.10 8.79 19.93 ***
TOTHJOB 0.22 0.42 0.46 0.50 -0.24 **
TSCORE 0.56 0.80 0.31 0.58 0.25 *
TSPECIAL 0.31 0.47 0.58 0.49 -0.27 **
MINS_QUIZ 43.50 38.74 52.79 37.53 -9.29
MINS_HWORK 44.78 35.03 42.43 37.57 2.35
LESSON_PLN 0.16 0.37 0.13 0.34 0.02
EXPLAIN 0.38 0.49 0.44 0.50 -0.07
QUESTIONS 0.63 0.49 0.59 0.49 0.04
School Characteristics
GIRLS_SCHOOL 0.63 0.50 0.19 0.40 0.43 ***
RESOURCE 54.94 11.85 68.03 13.28 -13.09 ***
LENGTH_STUDY 1591.88 220.11 1704.17 208.08 -112.29 *
CLASSIZE 51.81 25.28 23.36 10.86 28.45 ***
Note: Variables marked by * are 0/1 indicator variables with Yes = 1 and No = 0.
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Table 3: OLS (Across School) Achievement Production Functions by Subject 
LANGUAGE MATHEMATICS
(1) (2) (3) (1)) (2) (3)
Pupil Characteristics Coefficient
(Robust t)
Coefficient
(Robust t)
Coefficient
(Robust t)
Coefficient
(Robust t)
Coefficient
(Robust t)
Coefficient
(Robust t)
AGE_YRS -0.109
(-0.4)
-0.071
(-0.2)
-0.033
(-0.1)
0.063
(0.2)
0.049
(0.2)
0.059
(0.2)
AGE2 0.001
(0.1)
0.000
(0.0)
-0.002
(-0.1)
-0.002
(-0.2)
-0.001
(-0.1)
-0.002
(-0.2)
FEMALE 0.243
(0.9)
0.220
(0.8)
0.234
(0.9)
-0.392
(2.7) ***
-0.389
(-3.2) ***
-0.322
(-2.5) **
NUMSIS -0.038
(-2.0) **
-0.038
(2.1) **
-0.038
(-2.1) **
-0.057
(-4.0) ***
-0.065
(-4.6) ***
-0.061
(-4.3) ***
NUMBRO -0.028
(-1.5)
-0.024
(-1.3)
-0.027
(-1.4)
-0.005
(-0.3)
-0.014
(-0.8)
-0.008
(-0.5)
EDUWISH 0.106
(3.7) ***
0.118
(5.1) ***
0.113
(4.3) ***
0.073
(3.8) ***
0.083
(4.0) ***
0.073
(3.7) ***
MEDYRS 0.004
(0.6)
0.004
(0.5)
0.002
(0.3)
0.009
(1.7) *
0.011
(2.0) **
0.009
(1.7) *
RAVEN 0.035
(10.7) ***
0.035
(10.9) ***
0.034
(11.2) ***
0.034
(9.9) ***
0.034
(9.8) ***
0.033
(9.7) ***
TIRED -0.114
(-3.7) ***
-0.138
(-4.7) ***
-0.129
(-4.6) ***
-0.007
(-0.3)
-0.002
(-0.1)
-0.015
(-0.5)
BOOKS 0.146
(2.2) **
0.135
(2.3) **
0.119
(2.2) **
0.245
(5.2) ***
0.266
(5.8) ***
0.234
(5.6) ***
LNFINCOME -0.010
(-0.6)
-0.010
(-0.6)
-0.012
(-0.8)
-0.002
(-0.1)
0.011
(0.7)
-0.001
(-0.1)
HTUTAKEN -0.065
(-0.7)
-0.079
(-0.9)
-0.091
(-0.9)
-0.160
(-1.8) *
-0.209
(-2.3) **
-0.148
(-1.7) *
Teacher 
Characteristics
FEMTEACH 0.422
(1.4)
0.264
(0.8)
0.289
(0.9)
-0.085
(-0.6)
-0.176
(-1.3)
-0.061
(-0.4)
FEMSTUDTEACH -0.204
(-0.6)
-0.081
(-0.2)
-0.079
(-0.3)
0.309
(1.6)
0.327
(1.9) *
0.156
(0.9)
TMA_PROF 0.117
(0.8)
0.143
(0.9)
0.100
(0.6)
-0.028
(-0.3)
-0.061
(-0.7)
-0.003
(0.0)
TTRAINYRS 0.031
(0.2)
-0.075
(-0.6)
-0.060
(-0.5)
0.046
(1.0)
0.038
(0.7)
0.035
(0.6)
TEXP 0.019
(0.5)
0.034
(0.9)
0.043
(1.1)
0.012
(0.7)
-0.012
(-0.7)
-0.001
(0.0)
TEXP2 -0.001
(0.7)
-0.002
(-1.2)
-0.002
(-1.4)
-0.001
(-1.4)
0.000
(-0.3)
0.000
(0.6)
TTENURE 0.007
(0.5)
0.022
(1.6)
0.015
(1.0)
0.024
(2.4) **
0.029
(2.8) ***
0.025
(2.2) **
TTABSENT -0.003
(-1.9) *
-0.002
(-1.6)
-0.003
(-1.9) *
0.000
(0.0)
-0.006
(-1.3)
-0.003
(-0.5)
TOTHJOB 0.115
(0.9)
0.046
(0.3)
-0.030
(-0.2)
-0.006
(-0.1)
-0.012
(-0.1)
-0.046
(-0.4)
TSCORE 0.089
(0.9)
0.005
(0.0)
0.022
(0.2)
0.045
(0.5)
-0.023
(-0.3)
0.020
(0.2)
TSPECIAL -0.039
(-0.2)
-0.085
(-0.5)
-0.094
(-0.5)
0.205
(2.5) **
0.302
(3.6) ***
0.210
(2.2) **
MINS_QUIZ/10
-
0.040
(2.4) **
0.030
(1.8) * -
-0.020
(-1.2)
-0.011
(-0.7)
MINS_HWORK/10
-
-0.021
(-0.9)
0.002
(0.1) -
0.002
(0.1)
0.010
(0.7)
LESSON_PLN
-
0.236
(0.9)
0.291
(1.0) -
-0.296
(-1.6)
-0.192
(-1.0)
EXPLAIN 
-
0.211
(1.6)
0.242
(1.6) -
0.366
(2.6) ***
0.328
(2.1) **
QUESTIONS
-
-0.266
(-1.3)
-0.278
(-1.4) -
0.004
(0.0)
0.042
(0.4)
School Characteristics
GIRLS_SCHOOL 0.070
(0.3) -
0.061
(0.3)
-0.112
(-0.6)
- -0.030
(-0.2)
RESOURCE 0.002
(0.4) -
0.004
(0.8)
0.012
(3.1) ***
- 0.009
(2.0) **
LENGTH_STUDY/1000 0.439
(1.3) -
0.567
(1.7) *
-0.318
(-1.6)
- -0.472
(-2.9) **
CLASSIZE/100 0.007
(0.0) -
0.070
(0.2)
-0.499
(2.2) **
- -0.368
(-1.5)
CONSTANT -1.344
(-0.6) -
-2.293
(-1.0)
-1.990
(-0.9)
- -1.511
(-0.7)
N 1353 1353 1353 1353 1353 1353
R2 0.3702 0.3877 0.3978 0.4547 0.4633 0.4633
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Table 4: Achievement Production Functions (Two subjects, Pooled without and with ‘teaching 
process’ variables)
OLS School Fixed Effects Pupil Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coefficient 
(Robust t)
Coefficient
(Robust t)
Coefficient
(Robust t)
Coefficient
(Robust t)
Coefficient
(Robust t)
Coefficient
(Robust t)
FEMTEACH -0.014
(-0.1)
-0.016
(-0.1)
-0.388
(-2.7) ***
-0.486
(-3.8) ***
-0.427
(-5.8) ***
-0.537
(-7.1) ***
FEMSTUDTEACH 0.274
(1.9) *
0.222
(1.7) *
0.560
(4.7) ***
0.610
(4.8) ***
0.656
(6.7) ***
0.733
(7.3) ***
TMA_PROF 0.035
(0.4)
-0.008
(-0.1)
0.005
(0.0)
-0.076
(-0.6)
0.008
(0.1)
-0.075
(-1.2)
TTRAINYRS 0.000
(0.0)
-0.069
(-1.2)
0.038
(0.6)
0.016
(0.2)
0.043
(1.5)
0.022
(0.8)
TEXP 0.014
(0.8)
0.027
(1.6)
-0.035
(-2.0) **
-0.020
(-1.4)
-0.036
(-3.8) ***
-0.022
(-2.1) **
TEXP2 -0.001
(-1.3)
-0.001
(-1.7) *
0.001
(1.2)
0.001
(1.4)
0.001
(2.3) **
0.001
(2.2) **
TTENURE 0.021
(2.8) ***
0.019
(2.6) ***
0.018
(3.1) ***
0.010
(1.7) *
0.018
(4.9) ***
0.010
(2.4) **
TTABSENT -0.001
(-0.4)
0.000
(0.0)
0.000
(0.2)
0.000
(-0.5)
0.000
(0.3)
-0.001
(-0.7)
TOTHJOB 0.064
(0.7)
0.069
(0.7)
0.085
(0.6)
0.169
(1.5)
0.086
(1.6)
0.170
(3.3) ***
TSCORE 0.116
(1.7) *
0.092
(1.1)
0.087
(1.8) *
0.095
(2.0) *
0.086
(3.0) ***
0.092
(2.8) ***
TSPECIAL 0.179
(2.3) **
0.129
(1.5)
0.029
(0.4)
-0.044
(-0.6)
0.024
(0.7)
-0.048
(-1.2)
MINS_QUIZ/10 - 0.032
(3.1) ***
- 0.030
(2.2) **
- 0.030
(3.8) ***
MINS_HWORK/10 - -0.012
(-0.8)
- -0.020
(-2.0) **
- -0.021
(-3.8) ***
LESSON_PLN - 0.144
(1.1)
- 0.219
(1.4)
- 0.230
(2.7) ***
EXPLAIN - 0.141
(1.6)
- 0.040
(0.5)
- 0.043
(0.9)
QUESTIONS - -0.161
(-1.7) *
- 0.210
(2.1) **
- 0.210
(3.8) ***
Subject Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pupil Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
School Variables Yes Yes No No No No
N 2706 2694 2706 2694 2706 2694
R2/R2 within 0.3879 0.4048 0.1988 0.2114 0.0825 0.1197
No. of Groups - - 50 50 1353 1353
F (p-value) 23.31 (0.000) 37.86 (0.000) 43.24 (0.000) 33.68 (0.000) 11.57 (0.000) 11.97 (0.000)
Table 5: Pupil Fixed Effects Achievement Function by School Type
Table 6:  Regression of Log of Teacher Pay, (Government and Private, pooled) 
PRIVATE GOVERNMENT
Coefficient
(Robust t)
Coefficient
(Robust t)
TMA_PROF -0.585
(-4.3) ***
0.069
(0.8)
TTRAINYRS -0.146
(-3.9) ***
-0.004
(0.0)
TEXP 0.026
(1.1)
-0.025
(1.1)
TEXP2 -0.003
(-2.9) ***
0.001
(1.0)
TTENURE 0.043
(2.4) **
0.009
(1.3)
TTABSENT 0.006
(1.7) *
0.001
(0.6)
TOTHJOB 0.407
(4.9) ***
-0.216
(-1.8) *
TSCORE 0.047
(0.8)
0.169
(1.8) *
TSPECIAL -0.176
(-2.8) **
0.107
(1.0)
MINS_QUIZ/10 0.048
(4.2) ***
0.037
(2.7) **
MINS_HWORK/10 -0.013
(-1.8) *
0.010
(0.5)
LESSON_PLN 0.222
(0.8)
-0.053
(-0.3)
EXPLAIN 0.063
(0.9)
0.070
(0.6)
QUESTIONS 0.569
(5.6) ***
0.065
(0.7)
Subject Dummy Yes Yes
N 1424 1270
No. of Groups 718 635
R2 within 0.1380 0.1768
Across School
(OLS)
Within School
(School Fixed Effects)
(1) (2) (3)
Coefficient
(Robust t)
Coefficient
(Robust t)
Coefficient
(Robust t)
FEMTEACH -0.080
(-0.9)
-0.1292
(-1.3)
0.0652
(0.6)
TMA_PROF 0.314
(4.8) ***
0.3698
(5.0) ***
0.1537
(3.1) ***
TTRAINYRS -0.046
(-1.6)
0.0270
(0.9)
0.0166
(0.7)
TEXP 0.027
(2.6) ***
0.0554
(4.3) ***
0.0267
(2.9) ***
TEXP2 -0.000
(-0.9)
-0.0008
(-2.1) **
-0.0004
(-1.4)
TTENURE 0.005
(0.6)
0.0028
(0.3)
0.0084
(1.5)
TTABSENT 0.002
(1.8) *
0.0037
(3.2) ***
0.0008
(1.1)
PRIVATE -1.072
(-6.7) *** -
Average Student Mark
STDMARK1 0.337
(3.7)
*** 0.1836
(1.9)
* -
CONSTANT 8.416
(23.5)
*** 7.8213
(15.7)
*** 7.9382
(96.7)
***
Subject Dummies Yes Yes Yes
School Variables Yes Yes No
N 336 336 336
No. of Groups - - 65
Mean Dependent Var.
Adjusted R2/ R2Between 0.685 0.5721 0.5149
Table 7: Regression of Log of Teacher Pay, by School-type
Private Government
Across School Within School 
(school fixed-effects)
Across School Within School 
(school fixed-effects)
Coefficient
(Robust t)
Coefficient
(Robust t)
Coefficient
(Robust t)
Coefficient
(Robust t)
FEMTEACH -0.1494
(-1.5)
0.0060
(0.6)
-0.0895
(-3.2) ***
-
TMA_PROF 0.2485
(2.7) ***
0.1325
(1.8) *
0.1803
(2.9) ***
0.1739
(2.4)
**
TTRAINYRS -0.0579
(-1.2)
-0.0143
(-0.4)
0.0408
(1.6)
0.0547
(1.9)
*
TEXP 0.0077
(0.5)
0.0034
(0.4)
0.0562
(4.0) ***
0.0508
(3.0)
***
TEXP2 -0.0001
(-0.2)
-0.0001
(-0.4)
-0.0008
(-1.9)
-0.0007
(-1.4)
TTENURE 0.0224
(1.3)
0.0282
(3.3) ***
-0.0023
(-0.7)
-0.0024
(-0.4)
TTABSENT -0.006
(-0.3)
0.0007
(0.4)
0.0009
(1.4)
0.0012
(1.7)
*
Average Student Mark
STDMARK1 0.2523
(2.6) ***
- 0.1340
(2.9) ***
-
CONSTANT 6.7184
(11.6) ***
7.8348
(99.7) ***
7.9934
(48.9) ***
8.0587
(57.5)
***
Subject Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
School Variables Yes No Yes No
N 218 218 118 118
No. of Groups - 40 - 25
Mean Dependent Var.
Adjusted R2/R2 Between 0.6658 0.1840 0.5837 0.6162
Appendix
Table A1: Regression of Log of Teacher Pay (School fixed-effects), by School-type 
excluding tenure
PRIVATE GOVERNMENT
Coefficient Robust t Coefficient Robust t
FEMTEACH 0.0555 0.5 -
TMA_PROF 0.1004 1.2 0.1781 2.7
TTRAINYRS -0.0149 -0.4 0.0536 1.8
TEXP 0.0292 3.7 0.0493 2.9
TEXP2 -0.0005 -1.9 -0.0007 -1.4
TTABSENT 0.0008 0.4 0.0012 1.7
CONSTANT
Subject Dummies Yes Yes
School Variables No No
N 218 118
No. of Groups 40 25
Mean Dependent Var.
Adjusted R2/ R2Between 0.2866 0.6097

